digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

Articles & Chapters

2009

Who's Afraid of Polygamy? Exploring the
Boundaries of Family, Equality and Custom in
South Africa
Penelope Andrews
New York Law School, penelope.andrews@nyls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Andrews, Penelope, "Who's Afraid of Polygamy? Exploring the Boundaries of Family, Equality and Custom in South Africa" (2009).
Articles & Chapters. 1287.
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters/1287

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

WHO'S AFRAID OF POLYGAMY? EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF
FAMILY, EQUALITY AND CUSTOM IN SOUTH AFRICA
Penelope E. Andrews*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRO DU CTION ...................................................................................................... 303
I. "COMPETING" NARRATIVES OF LIBERATION: AFRICAN NATIONALISM
AN D F EM INISM ....................................................................................................... 306
II. THE CONSTITUTION AND TRADITIONAL LAW ................................................. 311
II1. THE CONSTITUTION AND GENDER EQUALITY ................................................ 314
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND GENDER EQUALITY .......................... 316
V. GENDER EQUALITY AND POLYGAMY ......................................................... ... 320
VI. POLYGAMY AND THE RECOGNITION OF CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES ............... 325
VII. CONCLUSION ...................
: .................................. 331
INTRODUCTION

ANC president Jacob Zuma married his fourth wife, Nompumelelo
Ntuli, in a closely guarded, traditionalZulu ceremony in the ruralvillage
of Nkandla, in !northernKwaZulu-Natal, yesterday.
At his KwaNxamala homestead behind green security gates local
police barredthe media and daring wedding crashers while bodyguards
monitored the premises as Zuma, 65-an unashamed traditionalist,
appeased his ancestors.
Inside, a handful of Zuma well-wishers, including SA Road link's
chief executive Alan Reddy and businessman Abdul Rahim Malek,
witnessed the traditionalceremony.'
Jacob
interesting
the leader
Congress

Zuma's wedding to his fourth wife in early 2008, provides an
starting point for a discussion on family law, equality and custom. As
of the governing political party in South Africa, the African National
(A.N.C.), his private and public activities are worthy of some

(© 2009 Penelope E. Andrews, Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of
Law, and Chair in Law, LaTrobe University, Australia. B.A. LL.B (Natal) LL.M.
(Columbia). Thanks to Taunya Banks, the South Africa Reading Group, CUNY Law
School and Valparaiso Law School Faculty workshops for helpful comments on drafts of
this paper.
'Monica Laganparsad & Yasantha Naidoo, FourBetter orfor Worse, SUNDAY TIMES
(Johannesburg), Jan. 6, 2008, available at http://www.theiimes.co.za/PrintEdition
/Article.aspx?id=673124.
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consideration.2 As the quotation above notes, not only does his wedding confirm
his credentials as a Zulu traditionalist, but his guests included non-Zulu leaders of
the business community in South Africa-an indication of his prominence, not just
within his tribal community, but also as part of the wider South African elite. 3 The
presence of these prominent South Africans signifies a certain degree of approval
or acceptance of polygamy. Indeed, one of the A.N.C.'s most admired members,
the lawyer, Phyllis Naidoo, has admitted to paying lobolo 4 for Zuma's first wife,
and other prominent business people have paid for his several weddings.5
On the same day that Jacob Zuma was pursuing his fourth nuptials, one of
South Africa's most prominent gay activists also tied the knot.6 Since the South
African Constitutional Court has mandated the government to enact legislation that
would recognize gay civil unions, South Africa has witnessed an increase in the
number of "gay marriages." '7 These developments are quite significant in a country
where the human rights of gay men and lesbians have only officially been

2 Jacob

Zuma's public and private lives have been under intense scrutiny in the past

few years, as he survived his dismissal as Deputy-President of South Africa and a rape
acquittal (after a highly publicized case). He now faces a charge of corruption. Two of the
major. newspapers in South Africa have special 'eports on Zuma. See Jacob Zuma, Mail &
Guardian Online: The Smart News Source, http://www.mg.co.za/specialreport/jacob-zuma
(last visited June 21, 2009); SA Elections, http://www.saelections.co.za/ (last visited June
21, 2009).
3Newspapers in South Africa reported that Jacob Zuma is planning to marry his fifth
wife in a few months. See Zuma May Take Fifth Wife, NEWS24.CoM, Feb. 17, 2008,
http://www.news24.com[News24/SouthAfrica/Politics/0,,2-7-12_2272263,00.html. Some
have also added that in fact he also plans to marry a sixth wife, and that this has led to
some controversy amongst his wives, particularly as to who would become the first lady if
he is elected as President of the country. See Bongani Mthethwa & Subashni Naidoo, Jacob
Zuma in for a bridal shower, TIMES (Johannesburg), Feb. 16, 2008, available at
http://www.thetimes.co.za/News /Article.aspx?id=707756. South Africans go to the polls
in April 2009. As leader of the African National Congress, Jacob Zuma is widely expected
to become the President of South Africa.
4Lobolo describes a man's obligation to pay cattle, horses, money, or other property
to the father of his intended bride in consideration of their marriage. See T.W. BENNETT, A
SOURCEBOOK OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA 195 (1991.).
5

ld.
6 Diana-Marie Strydom, Zackie Achmat to Tie the Knot, DIE BURGER, Mar. 12, 2007,
http://www.news24.com/News24/Entertainment/Celebrities/0,,2-1225-2108_2232180,00.
html.
7See, James Kirchick, South Africa 's Gay Betrayal, THE GUARDIAN (London), Aug.
21, 2007, availableat http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/aug/21 /southafricas
gaybetrayal (noting that despite most South Africans opposing gay marriage, many gays
from Africa move there to seek refuge.).
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recognized in the past decade or so. 8 The South African government, despite
widespread homophobia in South Africa, has made a clear commitment to
protecting the rights of gay men and lesbians. 9
It is the marrying of the traditional and the contemporary, and the
constitutional endeavor to accommodate this reality that informs the analysis of
polygamy in South Africa.' 0
South Africa's transition from an authoritarian apartheid state to one premised
on democracy and human rights was of global significance and one that would
have a profound impact on evolving perceptions of democracy and good
governance in Africa.1" The promise of democracy, as encapsulated in South
Africa's expansive constitutional framework, one that embodied a range of civil
and political rights, on the one hand, and social, economic and cultural rights, on
the other, bode well for a continent beset by needless conflicts, widespread
corruption, and seemingly intractable poverty. President Nelson Mandela, ushered
in to lead this transformative project, embodied all the possibilities of this new
"rainbow nation.' 2 Most significantly, this transformative constitutional project
mandated a rethinking of the public and the private, recognizing that disadvantage
are often embedded in private arrangements and private
and discrimination
3
'
relationships.
8 See South Africa to Legalize Gay Marriage,MSNBC.COM,

Nov. 14, 2006, available

at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15714036 (stating that South Africa was the first in the
world to adopt a constitution prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation).
9 See David Beresford, South African Assembly Passes Gay Partnership Law, THE
GUARDIAN, Nov. 14, 2006, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/nov
/14/southafrica.gayrights.
'0 Dorothy L. Hodgson, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Women in Law and
Development in Africa, AFR. TODAY, Summer 2002, at 3, 12-13.
"As the Kenyan human rights scholar, Makau wa Mutua has noted:
The construction of the post-apartheid state represents the first deliberate
and calculated effort in history to craft a human rights state-a polity that is
primarily animated by human rights norms. South Africa was the first state to be
reborn after the universal acceptance, at least rhetorically, of human rights ideals
by states of all the major cultural and political traditions.
Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair For a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights
Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. L.J. 63, 65 (1997).
12 See ALISTER SPARKS, TOMORROW Is ANOTHER COUNTRY 228-39 (1996)
(describing Mandela's transformative leadership of South Africa).
13 The Constitution Of The Republic Of South

Africa [hereinafter
'CONSTITUTION'] provides that "A Provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a
juristic person ....
" S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ss. 8(2) and "No person may unfairly
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone ....
" Id. ss. 9(4). In addition, the
Constitution also provides that,"[I]n order to give effect to a right in the Bill [of Rights,].
." the common law should be developed accordingly. Id. s. 8(3)(a). The Constitutional

JOURNAL OF LAW & FAMILY STUDIES

354

[VOL. I I

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[No. 2

Although off to a good start, the governing principles of the "rainbow nation"
as embodied in the constitution, namely, dignity and equality, were soon to
confront competing expectations as to the meaning and interpretation of these
principles. These competing expectations surfaced in several contexts, but not
unsurprisingly, became more apparent in the discussion around traditional law and
gender equality. 14 In this respect, the South African experience mirrors the
situation in many countries in which the principle of gender equality appears to
contradict cultural or religious norms regarding women's role and status. 15
My paper will examine the evolution of South African legislation and
constitutional jurisprudence in the face of competing imperatives, for example,
between equality, legal pluralism, customary law/religious law, and the recognition
of polygamy. I explore legislative attempts to regulate polygamous marriages
through the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 16 ("the Act"), a statute
designed to "transform spousal relations in customary marriages,"17 by providing
for equality between the spouses, and by regulating all aspects of customary
marriages, including their establishment, property relationships, and dissolution.1
This paper also examines the tensions between the principle of gender equality on
the one hand, and the recognition of polygamy, on the other. 19
I. "COMPETING" NARRATIVES OF LIBERATION: AFRICAN NATIONALISM
AND FEMINISM

The long history of colonialism and apartheid, and local and global efforts to
eradicate apartheid meant that in the context of post-apartheid South Africa, the

Court discussed sections in some length in Du Plessis & Othersv De Kle*rk & Another 1996
(3) SA 850 (CC)
97, 126. while interpreting a similar provision under the first
Constitution.
14 For a discussion of these issues, see Penelope E. Andrews, Striking the
Rock:
Confronting GenderEquality in South Africa, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 307, 309 (1998).
15 See ANN

E. MAYER,

ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 93

(2006) (describing Islamic countries' refusal to grant women equal liberties).
16 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.

Gumede (born Shange) v Presidentof the Republic of South Africa & Others 2009
(3) BCLR 243 (CC) 32 (S.Afr.).
18
Id. at
3, 24, 32.
17

'9This paper refers only to indigenous marriages, and does not address legislative
attempts to regulate religious, especially Islamic marriages. There have been attempts by
the South African government to address marriages conducted by Islamic law, but draft
legislation has not yet been passed by Parliament See Rashida Manjoo, The Recognition of
Muslim PersonalLaws in South Africa: Implicationsfor Women's Rights 3 (Harvard Law
Sch. Human Rights Program at, Working Paper No. 08-21,
http://ssm.com/abstract=l 115987.

2007), available at
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discourse of feminism or gender equality had to "compete ' ' 20 with other liberatory
discourses, including anti-racism, African nationalism, and cultural nationalism.
Indeed the issue of gender equality only surfaced after determined attempts by
South African women to ensure that women's issues would not be overlooked in
the new democratic dispensation. 21 The Constitution of South Africa, especially
the Bill of Rights, mediates the challenges, of the competing discourses of
feminism and African nationalism by. recognizing indigenous institutions, and
prioritizing the principle of equality. 22 In addition, the Bill of Rights places the

eradication of discrimination on the grounds of race on the same constitutional
footing as the eradication of discrimination on the grounds of sex and/or gender.23
My paper examines the regulation of African customary marriages within the
overall context of political transformation and democratic nation-building in South
Africa. The passage of the Act occurs against the backdrop of ongoing
contestations about the meaning of the newly established democracy in the wake of
centuries of colonialism and decades of apartheid. 24 After the first democratic
election in 1994, and the adoption of a comprehensive constitutional framework
that included an expansive Bill of Rights, South Africans faced the task of creating
a legal order consonant with the norms and values of an African state, underpinned
by the principle of "ubuntu,, 2 5 and away from the hegemonic tendencies of the
colonial legal framework.
The new constitutional framework embraced the vision of a pluralistic society
that strives to incorporate historically marginalized legal systems and institutions,
including those of indigenous and religious minorities, within the broader South
African legal framework. This incorporation, at least at the theoretical level,

represented the rejection of the legacy of colonialism and apartheid and an
ethnocentric bias that had relegated indigenous laws and institutions as inferior
the term "compete" very loosely here. The central idea is that the eradication
of gender inequalities was secondary to the eradicatio of racial inequalities and
authoritarianism. The issues are discussed in Penelope E. Andrews, The Stepchild of
National Liberation: Women and Rights in the New South Africa, in THE POST-APARTHEID
CONSTITUTIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH AFRICA'S BASIC LAW 326-358 (Penelope E.
Andrews & Stephen Ellmann eds., 2001) (describing numerous efforts and the competition
for attention from closely related social concerns).
21 See PUTTING WOMEN ON THE AGENDA (Susan Bazilli ed., 1991); see also THE
CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE 64 (Sandy Liebenberg ed.,
1995) (describing the specific efforts of South African women to encourage response to
these issue under a democratic regime).
20

1 use

22

See infra notes 36-42
Andrews, supra note 21, at 335.

23

explore these issues in Penelope E. Andrews, "Big Love"? The Recognition of
Customary Marriagesin South Africa, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1483, 1487, 1493 (2007).
Afr.) the court explored the
25 In S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 446 (S.
concept of ubuntu in some detail, explaining the interlocking and underlying humanity that
underpins indigenous cultures.
24 1
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partners in law and governance. 26 For black women, such rejection was especially
significant, since a combination of apartheid and indigenous law in many ways
rendered them perpetual minors.2 7 The modernist project of constitutionalism and
human rights in South Africa and the recognition of gender equality and cultural
and religious rights signaled a commitment to full citizenship for South African
women. This was notable for an African country at the end of the 20th century,
illustrating how the embrace of a pluralistic model of constitutionalism provided
an important symbolic and real possibility for democracy in Africa. 8
The South African Constitution, in spirit and in text, embraced the rights of all
South Africans to practice their culture and religion.2 9 Successive colonial and
apartheid governments had ambivalent and contradictory policies regarding
indigenous law and indigenous institutions. 30 However, the "Africanization ' 31 of
the new constitutional state was a precondition for democracy, and a clear signal
that South Africa would shed its colonial and apartheid past. But such derogation
from the country's ignominious past generated a challenge with respect to the
embedding of equality as the signature constitutional principle. Simply put, how
was the Constitution to balance, on the one hand, the constitutional commitment to
equality, while on the other finally providing formal recognition to indigenous
laws and institutions? Accommodating this apparent paradox was key-since
indigenous laws and institutions had always been relegated to a secondary or
26

The nefarious Black Administration Act 38 of 1927, now repealed, was designed to

pigeonhole traditional leaders into disputes that rose only between black, and within a very
narrow range of claims. See Martin Chanock, Law, State and Culture: Thinking about
'Customary Law'After Apartheid, 1991 ACTA JURIDICA 52, 55-57.
27 See Andrews, supra note 24, at 1496 n.82.
28 See Victoria Bronstein, Reconceptualising the Customary Law Debate in South
Africa, 14 S.AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 388, 388-89 (1998); Yvonne Mokgoro, Traditional
Authority and Democracy in the Interim South African Constitution, 3 REV. CONST. STUD.
60, 60 (1996).
29 By using the term "customary law" I am sweeping with a broad brush. Customary

law is not a unified system of law, but instead refers to a largely heterogeneous, written and
unwritten, formal and informal, systems of law. In the Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act 120 of 1998 s. I(ii), "customary law" is defined as "the customs and usages
traditionallyobserved among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which
form partof the culture of those peoples." (emphasis added).
30 Ryan F. Haigh, South Africa's Criminalizationof "Hurtful" Comments: When the

Protection of Human Dignity and Equality Transforms into the Destruction of Freedom of
Expression, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 187, 192 (2006).

3'Successive South African governments, and indeed the white population, had
always regarded South Africa as a European country on the tip of the continent of Africa.
The legal system, legal processes, the legal profession, and indeed the legal culture, had
always been regarded as European, rather than African. The ,new democracy demanded a
shift-a recognition that South Africa was an African country and formally engaged with
the wider community of African states. See THE SMALL MIRACLE: SOUTH AFRICA'S
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT (Steven Friedman ed., 1994).
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inferior place within the national legal framework.32 These were not mere
theoretical considerations. The struggle for democracy in South Africa involved
both the struggle for women's equality as well as the struggle of African people for
the renewal and re-establishment of indigenous laws and customs. These two
"competing" struggles generated their own liberatory discourses of gender equality
and Africanism.
Both discourses sought an end to a particularized hegemony, namely racism
and apartheid, on the one hand, and patriarchy, on the other, although patriarchy
took on an especially racialized form in apartheid South Africa.33 Often these
discourses were framed in terms of a debate that sought to prioritize one over the
34
other, or at least provide some clarity with respect to the meaning of equality.
These debates were at their most fraught when it came to women's human rights.35
This debate was one that had occupied human rights advocates for some decades,
and had spawned a vast literature . about the role and status of indigenous
institutions in contemporary constitutional frameworks that valorize the principle
of gender quality.
Termed "the relativism versus universalism debate, 36 it sought to highlight
competing approaches to the recognition of indigenous laws and policies,
particularly in the face of demands for gender equality. 37 After several rather
disappointing decades of post-colonial neglect of gender equality on the part of
African governments, despite formal promises of equality, feminist advocates have
been more vocal about the need to have a "zero tolerance attitude" 38 to gender
equality. They have eschewed "relativist" approaches that seek to give primacy to
indigenous laws and policies even when such laws and policies violate the
principle of gender equality.39 South Africa, so recently decolonized, could
therefore benefit tremendously from the lessons generated by the "universalism
versus relativism" debate, and the advocacy strategies for gender equality flowing
32

Id.

33

See

AFRICA

(UN)THINKING

CITIZENSHIP: FEMINIST DEBATES IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH

7 (Amanda Gouws ed., 2005).
1-6.

34 See id. at

See id.
See Rhoda E. Howard, Group versus Individual Identity in the African Debate on
Human Right, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 159, 159183 (1990) [hereinafter HOWARD, Group versus Individual Identity]; see RHODA E.
HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 1-6, 109-12 (1995)
31
36

[hereinafter Howard,

HUMAN RIGHTS].

31 See Howard, Group versus Individual Identity, supra note 36, at 177-78.
38

"Zero-tolerance" is a term coined by former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, in an attempt

to wipe out crime in New York. See ANDREA MCARDLE, Introduction to

ZERO-TOLERANCE
QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE NEW POLICE BRUTALITY IN NEW YORK CITY 1, 12 (Andrea

McArdle & Tanya Erzen eds.) (2001). McArdle & Erzen are editors, the book is a
collection of pieces written by different authors.
39 See HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 36, at 17-18, 51.
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from such debates. But South Africa was also in an optimal position to forge a
direction that might incorporate the most effective human rights approaches, those
that did not merely pit the demands of African nationalism against gender equality,
but could rather develop a nuanced strategy that was mindful not only of the
historical legacy of the marginalization of indigenous laws and institutions, but
also the ubiquitous subjugation of women.40
In framing the fissures between the two discourses, namely African
nationalism and feminism, I am not suggesting a mere gender divide, namely, that
one is presumptively male, and the other female. In fact, in South Africa, lobbying
for the recognition of indigenous institutions was not just a male-only enterprise,
although it was largely so. And indeed, if one observes the support from Zulu
women for the acquittal of Jacob Zuma in his rape trial in 2006, one has to
conclude that significant numbers of Zulu women regard their traditional heritage
and identity as important.41 Conversely, the push for the absolute primacy of
equality, racial and gender, reflects not just the agitation of female advocates
(although their numbers were greater than men), but also men who were involved
in the constitution drafting process.42
This paper will suggest that the desired goal of equality in South Africa may
feature similarities with Western feminists' notions of equality, but may not
necessarily embrace all of these notions. South Africa, I will argue, provides what
may be considered a third way of straddling the equality conundrum that has so
bedeviled feminist analyses and discourse in the past few decades.43
40 This nuanced approach has been advocated by several feminist scholars. See, e.g.,
AYELET

SHACHAR,

MULTICULTURAL

JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL

DIFFERENCES

AND

WOMEN'S RIGHTS 22-25, 61-62 (2001); Judy Scales-Trent, African Women in France
Immigration,family, and Work, in GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL

READER 141, 141-153 (Adrien K. Wing ed., 2000).
41

For a discussion of the Zuma rape trial, see Penelope Andrews, Democracy Stops at

my Front Door: Obstacles to Gender Equality in South Africa, 5 LoY. U. CHI. INT'L L.

REV. 15, 18-21 (2007). I do not wish to simplify the contours of this issue. How, when,

and why ethnic identity surfaces as central or compelling markers of identity are best left to
anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, or other scholars of demographics. I make
these statements based on empirical observations of a limited phenomena-in this case, the
Zuma rape trial.

42 See Catherine Albertyn, Women and the Transition to Democracy in South Africa,
in GENDER AND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 39, 54-63 (Christina Murray ed.,

1994).

43 See Celina Romany, Themes for a Conversation on Race and Gender in
International Human Rights Law, in GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN

INTERNATIONAL READER 67-78 (2000). See M. Jacqui Alexander & Chandra Talpade
Mohanty, Introduction to FEMINIST GENEALOGIES,

COLONIAL LEGACIES, DEMOCRATIC

FUTURES xiii, xiii-xlii (M. Jacqui Alexander & Chandra Talpade Mohanty eds., 1997);
Agnes Calliste & George J. Sefa Dei, Anti-Racist Feminism: A Conclusion to a Beginning,
in ANTI-RACIST FEMINISM: CRITICAL RACE AND GENDER STUDIES 165, 165-68 (2000).
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II. THE CONSTITUTION AND TRADITIONAL LAW

The colonial authorities always displayed a certain ambiguity towards African
cultural norms and traditional law. On the one hand, they condemned practices like
polygamy, complaining that the polygamous husband, "had too much land, leisure
and sex. Instead of working for an employer, as was his proper destiny, he battened
in ease on the labor of his wives. African women, said the colonists, were hardly
better off than slaves." 4
On the other hand, the colonial authorities wished to preserve indigenous
custom as a means of control and co-option/co-operation from indigenous
leaders.45 This was particularly so when an increasingly urban African population
began to challenge colonial laws and policies. 46 This legal dualism became the
basis of colonial, and later the apartheid government's system of judicial and tribal
administrators. In short, this dualism became the "cornerstone" of the system of
separate development and apartheid.4 7
In light of the ambiguous approach to indigenous laws and institutions, the
Constitution references the need for the recognition and incorporation of
indigenous laws and structures in several significant ways. First, the Bill of Rights
reifies the pluralistic character of the constitutional framework, while at the same
time remaining faithful to the ideals of equality and dignity, the values that anchor
the Bill of Rights. Section 30 provides that "Everyone has the right to use the
language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising
these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision in the Bill of
Rights. 48 In addition, Section 31 of the Bill of Rights ensures that "Persons
belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the
right, with other members of the community- to enjoy their culture, practice their
religion and use their language., 49 This section also provides that legislation may
be enacted that recognizes "marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system
of religious, personal or family law," 50 provided such recognition does not
44 HAROLD JACK SIMONS, AFRICAN WOMEN: THEIR LEGAL STATUS IN SOUTH AFRICA

15, 21-22 (1986).
45 For a thoughtful analysis of the processes of control and co-option, see MAHMOOD
-MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE
COLONIALISM 65-68 (1996).
46 SIMONS, supra note 44, at 42-43. As H.J. Simons notes: "Traditional leaders, the

diviners, herbalists and chiefs, had lost ground to the new elite. Whites regretted the
erosion of tribal discipline and the decay of customs that formerly kept young people in
check. Tribalism acquired merit. in the eyes of the administration." Id.
47 Martin Chanock, The South African Native AdministrationAct of 1927: Reflections
on a Pathological Case of Legal Pluralism, in THE RIGHTS OF SUBORDINATED PEOPLES

295, 295-323 (Oliver Mendelsohn & Upendra Baxi eds., 1994).
48 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 30.
49 Id. s. 31(1)(a).

'0 Id. s. 15(3)(a).
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contradict "other provisions of the Constitution.",51 These provisions arguably
relate to issues of equality and non-discrimination. Reinforcing the freedom of
association for all South Africans, the Bill of Rights. further provides that those
members of indigenous communities have the right "to form, join and maintain
52
cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.,
In addition to the rights found in the Bill of Rights, the South African
Constitution explicitly recognizes and protects both the institution and the role of
traditional leaders.53
Section 211 specifically provides that traditional authorities in furthering54
customary law "may function subject to any applicable legislation and customs.
The Constitution also mandates courts of law to "apply customary law when that
law is applicable, subject to55 the Constitution" and relevant laws that "specifically
deals with customary law.",

To realize the multicultural goals promoted in the Constitution, and to ensure
the pursuit and promotion of these rights, the Constitution sets up a Commission
for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and
Linguistic Communities. 6 With a directive to be "broadly representative of the
main cultural, religious and linguistic communities ' 57 that make up the population
of South Africa, as well as to "broadly reflect the gender composition"5 8 of the
country, the Commission is constitutionally mandated to pursue a range of
laudable goals. These include the goal "to promote and develop peace, friendship,
humanity, [and] tolerance" among the various "cultural . . . communities, on the
basis of equality, non-discrimination and free association." 59 The Commission also
is empowered under the Constitution to engage in educational, research, lobbying,
60
advisory, and other endeavors that affect "the rights of cultural... communities."
The implementation and enforcement of these rights is bolstered by the
constitutional requirement that the courts, including traditional courts, interpret
these rights as to "promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.' In
addition, the rights embodied in the Bill of Rights are to complement "other rights
or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by . . . customary law" 62 with the

5'Id. s. 15(3)(b).
52

Id. s. 31(1)(b).

53 Id.
54

Id. s. 211(2).
211(3).
Id. s. 185.
57
Id. s. 186(2)(a).
58 Id. s. 186(2)(b).
55
56 Id. s.

59

6
61
62

Id. s. 185(l)(b).

S. 185(2).
sId.
Id. s. 39(2).
Id. s. 39(3).
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caveat that the rights or freedoms encapsulated in indigenous law do not contradict
those found in the Bill of Rights.63
Some feminist and human rights scholars and advocates have been reluctant
to portray indigenous laws and institutions as antithetical to women's rights,
appreciating that the characterization of such a binary often downplays the
significance of a rights culture that is located within indigenous laws and
institutions.6 4 Unlike the dominant Western approach to rights discourse and
practice, centered on the individual, in indigenous laws and practice, rights are
often affiliated to communal interests. Some scholars have argued that the
communal approach trumps individual rights and therefore subordinates those in
the community, like women and children, who tend to be more vulnerable. 65 In
many ways, the South African Constitution attempts to reach a more
contextualized approach to indigenous law, acknowledging its salience to the lives
of indigenous communities, whilst at the same time recognizing that indigenous
laws and institutions should not be immunized from the democratizing
prerogatives and rights culture embodied in the Constitution.
In one of its earlier decisions, the Constitutional Court in effect noted that
customary law, like the common law, was fluid and always evolving, and therefore
capable of conformity with the Bill of Rights.6 6 In fact, Justice Sachs has noted
that:
[W]e reject the once powerful common-law traditions associated with
patriarchy and the subordination of servants to masters, which are
inconsistent with freedom and equality . . . . I am sure that there are
many aspects and values of traditional African law which will also have
63

Id.

64 See, e.g., T.R. Nhlapo, The African Family and Women's Rights: Friendsor Foes?,
ACTA JURIDICA 135, 143-45 (arguing that African community values, as presently

1991
constituted, act to discriminate against women and children, but that "it would be perverse
to argue for the abolition . . . of the role of the wider family and the community in
marriage" because "[t]he positive aspects of [these] communal value[s] are too clearly
demonstrated").
See T.W. BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW UNDER THE
SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 5 (1995) (countering that "[i]t does not follow from an
65

absence of rights that women and children were systematically abused, neglected or treated
like chattels"); see also I. Currie, The Future of Customary Law: Lessons from the Lobolo
Debate, 1994" ACTA JURIDICA 146, 151("[T]he constitutional protection of a right to
'cultural life' may require a court to take account of the structural complexities and social
ramifications of ... customs before considering their revision or abolition in the light of
egalitarian principles."); Nhlapo, supra note 64, at 143-45 (describing the discriminatory
effect of African community values on women and children).
66

See Ex Parte Chairpersonof the ConstitutionalAssembly: In Re Certification of the

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at 834 (S. Afr.) (noting
customary law's ability to "develop and be interpreted, to future social evolution").
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to be discarded or developed in order to ensure compatibility with the
principles of the new constitutional order.67
In a more recent decision, the Constitutional Court, however, struck down a
customary law of intestate succession, deeming such law contradicted the principle
of equality.6 8
III. THE CONSTITUTION AND GENDER EQUALITY
The South African Constitution outlines clearly a commitment to gender
equality. The Founding provisions emphasize the values that underpin South
Africa's democracy, including the principles of non-racialism and non-sexism.69
Equality is the quintessential value, and the key provisions with respect to gender
equality are found in the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights incorporates equality as
the primary right, providing an elaborate definition of equality, including that
"everyone is equal before the law" and everyone "has the right to equal protection
and benefit of the law.",70 In addition, the section outlining equality provides that,
"[t]he state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on
one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic
age, disability, religion, conscience,
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation,
71
belief, culture, language and birth.,
The Bill of Rights "applies to all law," thereby making no distinction between
laws of a public nature, and those that govern private relations.7 This horizontal
application of the Bill of Rights allows some possibilities for bringing private
arrangements within the ambit of the Bill of Rights. This section is strengthened by
the constitutional mandate that legislation, customary law and the common law, be
interpreted in a way that furthers the "spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights. 73
The expansive nature of the Bill of Rights, including the proscription of both
direct and indirect discrimination in the section on equality, 74 has been heralded by
feminist scholars who have argued for some time that structural discrimination can
only be eroded by a clear commitment to a substantive, as opposed to a formal,

67
68

S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 518 (S. Aft.).
Bhe & Others v Magistrate,Khayelitsha, & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at 585

(S. Aft.).
69

S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ss. 1-6.

70

Id. s. 9(1).

71 Id. s. 9(3).
72 See.id. § 8(1).

71 Id. s. 39(2).
74 See id. s. 9.
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equality.7 5 Indeed, the Constitutional Court has reiterated its commitment to a
d
substantive equality in several of its judgments. 76 Not only does the Constitution
embody many transformative possibilities regarding equality for women, it also
recognizes the intersectionality of many forms of discrimination, and particularly
those that black women confront.77 Indeed, it has been argued that by treating the
elimination of gender discrimination as just as urgent as the elimination of racial
discrimination, the South African Constitution is a marked improvement to the
approach taken in the American constitutional framework.78
Several bodies are mandated in the Constitution to implement and enforce the
human rights listed in the Bill of Rights. Of particular note, in the pursuit of
women's equality, is the establishment of a Commission on Gender Equality to
"promote respect for gender equality,

'79

and to "monitor, investigate, research,

educate, lobby, advise and report on issues concerning gender equality. 80 Another
constitutionally mandated body to enforce equality is the Human Rights
Commission, although arguably, because its reference is so broad, it may relegate
the function of the pursuit of gender equality almost entirely to the Gender
Commission. 8'
The Bill of Rights also incorporates a range of rights to ensure that women are
secure in their person and that they are shielded from violence, in both the public
and private sphere.8 2 In addition, the Bill of Rights incorporate a range of socioeconomic rights that arguably could go some way to redressing the marginalized
economic status of women, thereby ensuring that whilst their civil and political
rights are adequately protected in the Constitution, that the root causes of the
75 See Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt, Facing the Challenges of Transformation:
Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudenceof Equality, 14 S. AFR. J.
ON HUM. RTs. 248, 249-50 (1998) (noting recent Constitutional Court decisions indicating
that "equality must be understood substantively rather than formally"); see also Andrews,
supra note 14, at 330-33 ("The court goes beyond the notion of formal equality, to one of
substantive equality.").
76 See Hugo v Presidentof the Republic of South Africa & Another 1996 (4)
SA 1012
(CC) at 1023 (S. Afr.); see also Fraserv Naude & Another 1998 (11) BCLR 1357 (CC) at
1360 (S. Afr.) (noting that the prospect of success via procedural means has to be weighed
against "the interest ofjustice").
77 The Bill of Rights provides that "[d]iscrimination on one or more of the grounds
listed ... is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair." S. AFR. CONST.
1996s. 9(5).
78 See Andrews, supra note 14, at 326-35.
79 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 187(1).
80
Id. s. 187(2).
81 The Human Rights Commission is established under Section 184 of the South
African Constitution. See id. s. 184. I have described in an earlier article how the
establishment of two bodies to implement human rights has generated a controversy
amongst feminist advocates in South Africa. See Andrews, supra note 14, at 330-3 1.
82 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 12(1).
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disadvantage and discrimination from which many women suffer from, namely
poverty, are also addressed.8 3
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND GENDER EQUALITY

In a series of cases since its inception in 1994, the Constitutional Court has
underscored the primacy of equality. 84 These cases include those involving the
rights of HIV-positive persons not to be discriminated against in their
employment; 85 the right of prisoners to vote; 86 the rights of unmarried fathers in
relation to adoption of their children; 87 the rights of permanent residents not to be
treated unfairly in comparison to citizens in the workplace; 88 the rights of
homosexuals to engage in consensual sexual conduct; 89 and the rights of African

girls and women not to be discriminated against under indigenous customary law. 90
In March, 2004, the Constitutional Court had occasion to consider a challenge
to the legal principle of male primogeniture as it applies to the African customary
law of succession, 91 the Intestate Succession Act,92 and the Black Administration

Act 93 and regulations flowing therefrom. The applicants in one case where the two
83 The Bill of Rights incorporates a range of socio-economic rights, including the
right of access to housing, health care, and education..Id, ss. 26, 27, 29.
84 See, e.g., Hoffman v South African Airways 2000 (1) BCLR 1211 (CC) 1220-22 (S.

Aft.) (providing the standard for evaluating allegations of inequality under the
Constitution); Presidentof the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708(CC) at
725-726 (S. Aft.) (finding that a Presidential Act that prima facia discriminates on the
basis set forth in Section 8(2) is entitled to a presumption that the discrimination is fair by
virtue of Section 8(4)); Brink v Kitschoof 1996 (6) BCLR .752 (CC) at 769 (S. Aft.)
(permitting multiple grounds for alleging discrimination under Section 8(2)).
85 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC) at 1213-15 (S.
Aft.).
86 August & Another v Electoral Commission & Others 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 3 (S.
Aft.).
87 Fraserv Naude & Another 1998 (11) BCLR 1377 (CC) at 1358-59 (S. Aft.).
88 Larbi-Odam & Others v MEC for Education (North-West Province) & Another
1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) 15 (S. Afr.).
89 National Coalitionfor Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice
and Others 2000 (2) SA I (CC) at 23 (S. Aft.).
90 Bhe & Others v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 581 (CC), at 594-600,
621-22 (S. Aft.).
9' Id.; Shibi v Sithole & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.); South African Human
Rights Commission and Women's Legal Center Trust v Presidentof the Republic of South
America and Ministerfor Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC)
(S. Aft.). The Court combined the three cases since they all concerned the question of
intestate succession under African customary law. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 581 (CC) at 593 (S.

Aft.).

92 Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987.
93 Black Administration Act Act 38 of 1927.
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minor daughters of the deceased 94 and in the other a sister of an unmarried
deceased brother.95 All three applicants had been denied the right to be declared96
heirs; male representatives instead stood to inherit the property of the deceased.
The other applicants were the Women's Legal Center Trust, a women's legal
advocacy organization in Cape Town, and the South African Human Rights
Commission, a state institution mandated by South Africa's Constitution to pursue
human rights in South Africa. 97 Both parties intervened in the case to persuade the
court that Section 23 of the Black Administration Act violated the South African
Constitution by unfairly discriminating against women in that it violated their right
children their Constitutionally guaranteed
to dignity and equality 98 and by denying
99
security.
and
safety
to
protections
The two central issues in the cases were the constitutional validity of Section
23 of the Black Administration Act,'00 which administered the intestate deceased
estates of Africans. This section provided that "all movable property belonging to a
Black and allotted by him or accruing under Black law or custom to any women
with whom he lived in a customary union, or to any house, shall upon his death
devolve and be administered under Black law and custom."' 0 1
The second issue was a constitutional challenge to the principle of
primogeniture. 1°2 The thrust of this rule is that only a male who is related to the
inherit in the absence of a will.' 0 3 Women may inherit when named
deceased 10may
4
in a will.
In practice this meant that generally it was the eldest son, or the father or male
cousins and uncles who were entitled to become heirs. 10 5 The principle mirrors

94

Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 581 (CC) at 594 (S. Aft.).

9'
96 See id. at 597.
See id. at 598.
97 See id. at 599.
98 S. AFR. CONST.
99 Id. s. 28.

1996 ss. 9-10.

'00 Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 s. 23.
"'1 Id. Section 23 also provided for other administrative matters regarding the
administration of black estates. Id. This section in effect set up a parallel system of intestate
succession for Black South Africans, some aspects of which mimic the Intestate Succession
Act, the system set up for White South Africans. Compare id. with the Interstate
Succession Act 81 of 1987 s. 1.
'0'Bhe & Others v Magistrate,Khayelitsha, & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at 593
(S. Afr.).
103/d. at 617.
104 Id. at 615.
105 It is worth nothing that these issues are not necessarily only those of affluent or
middle class individuals. For example, the Bhe property consisted of a temporary informal
shelter including the property on which it stood as well as miscellaneous items of movable
materials. See Id. at 596.
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other aspects of indigenous law in which
women are treated as perpetual minors,
06
always under the tutelage of a male.'
The rationale underpinning the exclusion of women was based on the fact
that:
(W)omen were always regarded as persons who would eventually
leave their original family on marriage, after the payment of roora/lobola,
to join the family of their husbands. It was reasoned that in the new
situation-a member of the husband's family-they could not be heads
of their original families, as they were more likely to subordinate the
interests of the original family to those of their new family. It was
therefore reasoned that in their new situation they would not be able to
look after the original family.' 07
In its judgment the Court examines the place of indigenous law in South
Africa's constitutional framework, recognizing its importance in South Africa's
culturally diverse society, rendering it both subject to and protected by the
Constitution, "accommodated, not merely tolerated" 10 8 by South African law.
Referring to the neglect of the positive aspects of customary law, including its
inherent flexibility, its preference for consensus-seeking and co-operation and its
"nurturing of healthy communitarian traditions, ' 09 customary law was nonetheless
subject to the Bill of Rights.
Dealing with the constitutionality of Section 23 of the Black Administration
Act, the Court held that in light of its history and context, the section is part of an
Act which was a "cornerstone of racial oppression, division and conflict"1" 0 and
that South Africans will take years to eviscerate its legacy. 11' The Court gave short
shrift to the argument that Section 23 reflects the pluralist nature of South African
society by giving recognition to customary law. The Court noted the racist and
destructive roles in entrenching division and subordination-a
role which "could
12
not be justified in any open and democratic society."''
The Court examined the rule of male primogeniture and held that the rule
unfairly discriminates against women and illegitimate children and declared it
unconstitutional. Recognizing that such was, however, no longer the setting in
which the rules existed, nonetheless, the communitarian context within which
It is not just widows, however, who are disadvantaged by the rule of male
primogeniture. The rule discriminates against daughters, younger sons (since the eldest is
deemed
the heir), and extra-marital children. See id. at 620.
107Id.at 646 (quoting Magaya v Magaya 1999 3 L.R.C. 35 (Zimb.)).
108 See id. at 604.
106

109 See id. at 606.
" 0 See id. at 612-13.

"'.See id. at 613.
" 2 See id. at 616.

2009]

FAMILY, EQUALITY AND CUSTOM IN SOUTH AFRICA

2009]

367

customary rules or succession developed, with its "safeguards to ensure fairness in
the context of entitlements, duties and responsibilities"
1 13 and its aim to "contribute
to the communal good and welfare," was noteworthy.
The Court pointed to the ensuing hardship that results from the application of
the rule "in circumstances vastly different from their traditional setting."'"1 4 The
Court in its judgment cited the importance of customary law in the organization of
communal societies, whilst acknowledging both the changing nature of indigenous
communities, particularly the role of urbanization in restructuring traditional
relationships.' 15 The Court also recognized the evolutionary nature of indigenous
law which continues to evolve and develop "to meet the changing needs of the
community." 6
In its remedy, the Court ordered that all intestate estates must now be
administered under the Intestate Succession Act, thereby creating a non-racial
uniform system across the country. 1 7 The Court made the order retrospective to
April 27, 1994, the day when the first Constitution of South Africa came into
effect.' 18
In a recent judgment, the Court had occasion to consider the constitutionality
of a section of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act that precluded wives
in customary marriage entered into before the passage of the Act, from the benefits
and protections offered in the Act.1 19 The disputed section of the Act provided that
"the proprietary consequences of a customary marriage entered into" before the
passage of the Act "continue to be governed by customary law."' 120 While the
property regime of marriages entered into after the promulgation of the Act was in
community of property, marriages governed by customary law provided that the
family head (the male), is the owner of all the family property, and has full control
over such property.' 21 The applicant in this case, who had entered into a customary
marriage in 1968, and therefore outside of the Act's protections, and who had
instituted divorce proceedings against her husband, claimed that the property
regime of customary marriages violated her rights to equality under the
13 See id. at 617.
114 See id. at 619.

" See id. at 617-18.
116 See id. at 618 (quoting Alexkor Ltd & another v The Richtersveld Community
&
Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) at 53 (S. Afr.)). This view reflects the holdings in courts in
other parts of Africa. Id. at 650. For example, the Nigerian Court of Appeal struck down an
Igbo succession rule which discriminated against women. Id. (citing Mojekwu v Mojekwu
[1997] 7 N.W.L.R. 305 (C.A.) (Nigeria).
"' Id.at 659.
"' Id.at 631.
119 See Gumede (born Shange) v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others

2009 (3) BCLR 243 (CC) 2-3 (S. Afr.).
120 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 s. 7(1).
121 Gumede 2009 (3) BCLR 243 (CC)
3 (S. Afr.) (citing KwaZulu Act on the Code
of Zulu Law 16 of 1985 s. .20).
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Constitution. 122 A lower court had found in her favor, and the Constitutional Court
confirmed that finding, holding that the impugned section of the Act, as well as the
customary law provisions, "patently limits the equality dictates of our [the]
Constitution."'123 Writing for the majority, Justice Moseneke observed the
"patriarchal domination over, and the complete exclusion of, the wife in the
owning or dealing with family property unashamedly demeans and makes
vulnerable the wife concerned and is thus discriminatory and
unfair. It has not been
'1 24
it."
for
justification
any
there
is
nor
shown to be otherwise,
These decisions discussed above suggest that the Constitutional Court,
although mindful of the need to respect the cultural rights of all South Africans, are
committed to ensuring that all members of indigenous communities enjoy those
rights without distinction or discrimination.
V. GENDER EQUALITY AND POLYGAMY
In the opening pages of this article, I juxtaposed the wedding of Jacob Zuma
to his fourth wife, with the wedding of a prominent gay couple. These twin
matrimonial celebrations reflect the liberal ideology of the South African
constitutional framework, and bode well for the toleration and acceptance of many
private lifestyles and forms of family arrangements (at least at the formal level).
But arguably, the recognition of the rights of gay people to marry is somewhat
different than the recognition of polygamy. The institution of polygamy is
embedded in patriarchal traditions that raise profound questions about the volition
of women who choose to enter into a polygamous arrangement. 2 Whether the
exercise to marry a polygamous husband is a free choice or not, it is arguably
circumscribed by economic pressures. The reality is that women's continuing
subordinate status in South Africa curtails the free exercise of her choice in a range
of situations, including whom she chooses to marry.1 26 While women continue to

122 In terms of the divorce degree, she was likely to receive only a very small portion

of the marital property. See Id. 2.
123

Id. 46.

124 Idr.

125

See Michele Alexandre, Big Love: Is Feminist Polygamy an Oxymoron or a True

Possibility?, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 6 (2007) (arguing that "Islam's inherent

concern with justice and equity for women requires that women's desires and wishes serve
as the foundation for any system of polygamy"); Thorn Brooks, The Problem with
Polygamy 4 (Newcastle Law Sch., Working Paper, 2009), available at http://papers.
ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1331492.
126 For a persuasive discussion on the many ways that polygamy violates a women's
right to equality, see Susan Deller Ross, Polygyny as a Violation of Women's Right to
Equality in Marriage: An Historical, Comparative and International Human Rights
Overview, 24 DELHI L. REV. 22 (2002).
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earn less than men 127 and are regarded in ways that reinforce stereotypes about
their role and status, it is difficult to talk about free choice in choosing a spouse.
This paper seeks to locate the cultural practice of polygamy within a narrative
of progress towards gender equality embodied in the South African constitutional
framework. This paper suggests that although polygamy is discriminatory (it
applies only to a male with several wives), that the legal regulation may in fact
provide rights, albeit limited ones, for women in polygamous marriages. In
addition, the legal regulation of customary marriages may lead to two
contradictory consequences. For those who do not find polygamy objectionable,
the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act may have the effect of
mainstreaming a cultural practice that has historically been "othered" and viewed
of polygamy,
as "uncivilized. 1 28 Conversely, for those who oppose the practice
29
legal regulation may in fact lead to the decline of the institution.
One of the most enduring narratives in the field of African legal history is the
cementing of the subordinate status of African women through the imposition on
colonial rule and in particular, indirect rule through the system of chiefs. In South
Africa, Martin Chanock and H. J. Simons have written extensively of this process
of subordination. 130 In their scholarship they persuasively illustrate how colonial
authorities, in the wake of growing urbanization and the need for labor, utilize
traditional law and institutions to ensure social control, and thereby a steady stream
of labor. 131 Very often, the reification of traditional law on the part of the colonial
authorities coincides with resulting disadvantage and discrimination for women.
Despite the colonial trope of female subjugation, my paper attempts to
unsettle some of the standard accounts by suggesting that women in polygamous
marriages may attempt to exercise some agency and a level of autonomy over their
sexuality. 32 This paper suggests that even in a seemingly irredeemably patriarchal
society like South Africa, that includes the institution of polygamy, women
continue to exercise some autonomy and resistance, including seeking legislative
protection. This private resistance on the part of women is difficult to measure
empirically. It is easier to highlight women's resistance to political repression,
through, for example, mass protests like the anti-pass campaigns of the 1950s.133
127

Elizabeth Sepper, Confronting the "Sacred and Unchangeable": The Obligation to

Modify CulturalPatterns Under the Women's DiscriminationTreaty, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
585, 602 (2008).
128 See supra notes 44-61.
129Id.
130

See Chanock, supra note 26, at 58; SIMONS, supra note 44, at 60-65.
Chanock, supra note 26, at 58; SIMONS, supra note 44, at 60-65.

131See
132

For an account of women's responses to polygamy, see Dominique Meekers &

Nadra Franklin, Women's Perceptions of Polygyny Among the Kaguru of Tanzania, 34
ETHNOLOGY 315, 315-29 (1995).
133See HILDA BERNSTEIN, FOR THEIR TRIUMPHS AND THEIR TEARS 89 (1985);

CHERYL WALKER, WOMEN AND RESISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

189-201 (1992).

JOURNAL OF LAW & FAMILY STUDIES

[VOL. I I

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[No.

370

2

The account in this paper is one of contestation that attempts to contextualize
women's resistance in the face of colonial and apartheid attempts to establish
control. It also shows how women, through the choices they make, try to influence
the substance and implementation of customary law. My paper suggests that it is
not just customary law, but traditional social relations-now increasingly
individualized-that may lead to greater equality for women.
In traditional African society polygamy was associated with affluence and
status.1 34 It was largely viewed as a "stabilizing tool," because of its capacity to
generate large families, which was seen as "a necessary social insurance. ,131 In
addition, a man with many wives was an indication of his sense of social
responsibility, and added to his social prestige.1 36 As one of Africa's prominent
leaders, the late Jomo Kenyatta, noted:
In Gikuyu the qualification to hold a high office is based on the
family and not -on property. It is held that if a man can control and
manage effectively the affairs of a large family, it is an excellent
testimonial on his capacity to look after the interest of the tribe whom he
will also treat 37with fatherly love and affection as though it were all part
of his family. 1
These words may reflect the sentiments of a bygone era, but arguably they
still resonate with notable sections of the African population in South Africa and
elsewhere.
H.J. Simons, an earlier South African feminist, has noted that polygamy
enabled all women to marry and bear children. 138 This was no small consideration
in societies where no individual, male or female, could live independently of a
family, and there was no possibility of gainful employment outside of the
household. Simons also observes that the monogamous marriage would have been
lonely for women, and that polygamy enabled 39wives to share the burdens of
household labor, child-bearing and child-rearing.
In the historical context where traditional households were self-sufficient and
where families consumed what they produced, it is clear that important socio134 See J. B. Ojwang, Polygamy as a Legal and Social Institution in Kenya, 10 E. AFR.

L.J. 63, 69 (1974).

135 Id.
116 Id. at 85.
137 Id.
138 SIMONS, supra note

44, at 81-82.
139 Id. at 81-82; see also Rhoda Howard, Women's Rights in English- speaking SubSaharan Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 46, 60 (Claude E.
Welch, Jr. & Ronald I. Meltzer eds., 1984) ("From the woman's point of view, polygamy
provides other women to share in child rearing, husband care, and possible economic
ventures ... ").
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economic considerations supported the institution of polygamy.1 40 The question
therefore arises whether polygamous unions comport with the contemporary
realities of an increasingly urbanized South Africa, with a constitutional
framework unequivocally committed to gender equality.
Some scholars have argued, for example, that polygamy degrades women and
reduces them to a servile status. 41 This is particularly the case of forced marriages,
men. 142
where young women are coerced by their families to marry powerful older
Others have noted that the institution of polygamy has survived largely by force of
habit and that it no longer serves a useful economic or social purpose. 143 They
observe that as the proportion of urbanized, educated
and professional women
144
increase that the incidence of polygamy will wane.
Ironically the Act may in fact contribute to a decline in polygamous unions. It
is my contention that the safeguards for women in the Act, as well as the
underlying principle of equality in South Africa's Constitutional and legal
framework, may in fact render polygamy an increasingly quaint, possibly obsolete
institution. As mentioned earlier in this paper, polygamy thrived during an earlier
socio-economic and political period, in societies that tolerated prejudiced attitudes
towards women. In fact, in those societies such attitudes institutionalized women's
subordination in legal codes.1 45 The imperatives of equality may become harder to
reconcile with an antiquated institution like polygamy, although Jacob Zuma's
example may contradict this observation.
The decline of polygamy as an institution may also be suggested from the
approach embodied international human rights instruments. For example, the
major women's human rights document, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 146 specifically calls on
governments "[t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women" that are based on notions of the "inferiority or the superiority" 147 of men
140

Felicity Kaganas & Christina Murray, Law, Women and the Family: The Question

of Polygamy in a New South Africa, in AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 116, 130 (T.W. Bennett
et al., eds., 1991); see also Ojwang, supra note 134, at 69-70 (stating that socio-economic
considerations helped to bring polygamy into existence).
141 See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 44,
at 81.
142 See Howard, supra note 139, at 61-62. To a large extent, the Act recognizes
these
problems and therefore mandates that women must exercise free choice in choosing a
marriage partner. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.
143 Kaganas & Murray, supra note 140,
at 131.
144 See
id.
145 Kenneth Kaunda, Transitions to Democracy in Africa, in DEMOCRATIZATION
IN
AFRICA: AFRICAN VIEWS, AFRICAN VOICES

12, 20 (Philip E. Converse & Sahr J. Kpundeh

eds., 1992).
146 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women,
G.A. Res. 180, at 193, UN. GAOR, 34th Sess. Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18,
1979) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
147 Id. art. 5(a).
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48
and women and that reinforces "stereotyped roles for men and women."'
CEDAW calls for the elimination of discrimination in marriage, and particularly
that men and women are imbued
with the "same rights and responsibilities during
' 49
dissolution."'
its
at
and
marriage
Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its Preamble refers
to the "dignity and worth of the human person and the equal rights of men and
women . . . .150 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides
that states "shall. take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and
responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and its dissolution."' 51 It
seems therefore apparent that at the international level, at least, the institution of
polygamy is hard to justify in the face of a formal commitment to gender equality.
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act purports to provide a measure
of protection for women and to ensure a somewhat conditional equality., 52 But
these protections may not be effective in the context of entrenched patriarchal
attitudes in South Africa, and in light of several impediments that continue to
thwart the quest for gender equality.
One impediment is continued economic
53
inequality and a persistent poverty.
Despite admirable economic gains for women in the new constitutional
dispensation, black women still labor under enormous disadvantages. They are the
least educated, still work disproportionately in menial and unskilled labor, and are
still subject to widespread discrimination
5 4 based on a combination of their race,
gender, class, and geographical location. 1
In one particular area, namely the HIV/AIDS epidemic, poverty has severely
impacted on women's human rights, and accounts for the disproportionate impact
of the epidemic on women. 5 5 The fact that polygamy legitimizes a man's ability to
have more than one sexual partner, does not mean that the capacity of wives in

148
49

id.

Id. art. 16(l)(c).
s0 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,

1

1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec.12, 1948).
' Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at
art. 23(4), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976).
152 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.
153 See Penelope E. Andrews, "Big Love "? The Recognition of Customary Marriages
in South Africa, 64 WASH. & LEE. L. REv. 1483, 1495-96 (2007) ("The first obstacle to
women's equality is widespread poverty.").
154 See, e.g., Penelope E. Andrews, Globalization, Human Rights and CriticalRace
Feminism: Voices from the Margins, 3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 373, 376-78 (2000).
155 See Lesley Doyal, HIV and AIDS: Putting Women on the GlobalAgenda, in AIDS:
SETTING A FEMINIST AGENDA 11, 17 (Lesley Doyal, Jennie Naidoo &Tamsin Wilton eds.,
1994).

2009]

FAMILY, EQUALITY AND CUSTOM IN SOUTH AFRICA

373

2009]

polygamous relationships to demand that their husbands engage
in safe sex
156
practices is strengthened by legislative oversight of such marriages.
Another impediment to equality that women experience relates to the
extraordinarily distressing levels of private violence that women are subjected to,
systematically, and with apparent impunity.157 I have argued elsewhere that this
violence is triggered and reinforced by several interlocking
layers of masculinities
1 58
that make legal protections alone somewhat ineffectual.
The law may in fact protect women in polygamous unions, but is this
sufficient to eliminate underlying notions about women's subordinated status and
role in society?
VI.

POLYGAMY AND THE RECOGNITION OF CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES

15 9

As mentioned earlier, successive colonial administrations and the apartheid
government regarded polygamy as "a heathen practice confined to the
unenlightened.' ', 60 The issues of polygamy and its continued existence therefore
provided the post-apartheid government with the opportunity to either abolish the
practice of polygamy outright, or to bring the practice 1in61 line with the new
constitutional dispensation. The government chose the latter.
As the Bill of Rights has increasingly affected many areas of South African
law, it has also begun to affect family law, and particularly the rights of women in
marriage. Until fairly recently, women in African customary unions had scant legal
protection, particularly if their husbands embarked on a subsequent civil law
(Christian) marriage. 16 1 Under the now repealed 63Black Administration Act, the
later marriage automatically extinguished the first.
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act represents an attempt by the
South African government to deal with the anomalous situation of women in
156 See id. at 18 (discussing the difficulty women have convincing their male partners
to use condoms during sexual intercourse).
157 See Penelope E. Andrews, Violence Against Women in South Africa: The Role of

Culture and the Limitations of the Law, 8 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 425, 426-27
(1999).
158 Penelope E. Andrews, Learning to Love After Learning to Harm: Post-Conflict
Reconstruction, Gender Equality and Cultural Values, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 41, 46-52
(2007).
159 For an earlier version of this discussion, see generally Andrews, supra note 24.
160 Kaganis & Murray, supra note 140, at 119.
161 For a critique of the Act, see D.I. Chambers, Civilizing the Natives: Marriage in
Post Apartheid South Africa, 129 DAEDALUS Fall 2000 at 101, 111-21.
162 See id. at 102-04; Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 s. 22(7).
163 To cure the inequity in this situation, in 1988 the Black Administration Act was
amended to preserve the property rights of women in customary unions. Specifically it
provided that the marital rights of women in customary unions were not affected by
subsequent civil marriages. See Marriage and Matrimonial Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988.
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customary unions being outside the ambit of formal protections provided to
women who are married according to civil law. The passage of the Act also
satisfied the South African government's obligations under international law,
65
164
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
including CEDAW,
including the Protocol of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on
the Rights of Women in Africa, 166 and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.1 67 Indeed, in the Preamble 68 to the Act, several goals are
articulated, including one that provides for the "equal status and capacity of
spouses in customary marriages."'169 In a purposive break from the colonial and
apartheid past, in which customary law was relegated to a place of legal
insignificance, the Act repeals several colonial and apartheid-era laws that
pertained only to the Black population. 70 As Deputy-Chief Justice Moseneke
recently noted in relation to the Act:
It [the Act] represents a belated but welcome- and ambitious
legislative effort to remedy the historical humiliation and exclusion
entered into in accordance with
meted out to spouses in marriages .
the law and culture of the indigenous African people of this country. Past
courts and legislation accorded marriages under indigenous law no more
"unions."' 7'
than d scant recognition under the lowly rubric of customary

164 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 180, at 193-98, UN. GAOR, 34th Sess. Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec.
18, 1979) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
165 Organization of African Unity: Africa Charter on Human's and Peoples' Rights
art. 18(3), June 24-27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M.
58, 62 (1982) (providing that, "[t]he State shall ensure the elimination of every
discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman
and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions.").
166 See Protocol to the African Charter on Human's and Peoples' Rights on the Rights
of Women in Africa, art. 2(2), Sept. 13, 2000, O.A.U. Doc. No. CAB/LEG/66.6 (entered
into force Nov. 25, 2005), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/affica/protocolwomen2003.html.
167 G.A. Res. 2200, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
168 See id. at art. 3 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure
the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth
in the present Covenant.").
169 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1988 Preamble (emphasis added).
170 These laws were: the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927, the Transkei Marriage
Act 21 of 1978, the KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law, Act 16 of 1985, and the Natal
Code of Law, Proclamation No. R151 of 1987.
17'
Gumede (born Shange) v Presidentof the Republic of South Africa & Others 2009
(3) BCLR 243 (CC) 16 (S.Afr.).
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It is difficult to assess the impact of the Act on the principle of gender
equality. The Act places customary marriages on the same footing as those that
pertain to civil (Christian) marriages. This formal recognition of customary
marriages gives effect to the spirit and intent of the Constitution, namely, to ensure
72
that "everyone has the right" to engage "in the cultural life of their choice."' In
essence, the dominant approach of the constitutional framework is one of legal
parity between the various cultural and religious norms, but always with an eye to
the maintenance of equality, despite the recognition of such legal parity. In
addition, the.Act does not just suggest a nod to gender equality, but by repealing
the many racially discriminatory laws 173 that only Africans were subjected to under
and apartheid, the Act also confirms the commitment to racial
colonialism
74
1
equality.
But one could read into the provisions of the Act a commitment to gender
equality. By providing full recognition to customary marriages, it may arguably
improve the status of wives within these marriages. 75 The Act- explicitly
incorporates the principle of equality between the spouses, stating that:
A wife in a customary marriage has, on the basis of equality with
her husband and subject to the matrimonial property system governing
the marriage, full status and capacity, including the capacity to acquire
assets and to dispose of them, to enter into contracts and to litigate, in
to any rights and powers that she might have at customary
addition
76
law.'
The legacy of unequal control and acquisition of property for women in
customary marriages no doubt prompted the drafters of the Act to ensure that
women would not continue to be deprived of the right to control and own property.
The Act therefore provides that a customary marriage "is a marriage in community
of property and of profit and loss between the spouses,"' 177 but the Act makes
contract that "regulates the
provision for the spouses to enter into an ante-nuptial
'' 78
marriage.
their
of
system
property
matrimonial
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.
laws were the Natal Code of Law, Proclamation R151 of 1987, the
KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law, Act 16 of 1985, the Transkei Marriage Act 21 of
1978, and the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927.
174
See Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 s. 12.
175This may be so despite the argument about the wider issue of polygamy, namely
that the institution is symbolic of patriarchy.
176 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 s. 6.
117Id.s.
7(2).
171.Id. s. 7(2). This section provides that: "A customary marriage entered into after the
commencement of this Act in which a spouse is not a partner in any other existing
customary marriage, is a marriage in community of property and of profit and loss between
the spouses, unless such consequences are specifically excluded by the spouses in an
172

173These
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The Act provides that a husband in a customary marriage "who enters into a
further customary marriage with another woman" must apply to a court to
"approve a written contract" to "regulate the future matrimonial property system of
his marriages."' 79 These provisions found in the Act reflect a clear desire on the
part of the legislature to ensure that wives in customary marriages are afforded a
range of protections that previously they had been denied, and consequently to
ensure a baseline equity during the subsistence and conclusion of a customary
marriage.180

The Act sets out certain conditions to validate customary marriages, including
that the parties to the marriage not be minors, and that full consent is given to the
marriage. 181 The Act further requires that customary marriages must be "negotiated
and entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary law."' 82 Where the
prospective spouse is a minor, the Act provides for the consent of parents or
guardians, and in the absence of such parental or guardian consent, the Act
provides for permission to be obtained from the183 Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development, or a government official.
The Act imposes a duty on the parties to a customary union to register their
marriage within twelve months of the marriage, and provides that if a registering
officer doubts the validity of a customary marriage, he or she may refuse to
register such marriage. 184 The Act also provides that "any person who satisfies a
registering officer that he or she has a sufficient interest" in the marriage may
"enquire into the existence of the marriage.' ' 185 The Act also provides that failure
to register does not affect the Validity of the marriage. 86 It is unclear why the Act
imposes a duty, and then in the same section directs that failure in carrying out
such duty does not affect the validity of the marriage. This section provision may
reflect a recognition of the reality that a larger proportion of customary marriages
occur in the rural areas, where the parties to such marriages may be unfamiliar
with the requirements of the Act as a result of distance and illiteracy.' 87
antenuptial contract which regulates the matrimonial property system of their marriage."
Id.

171
Id. s. 7(6).

Note, however, the caution sounded by a South African female scholar, who
suggests that despite the provisions of the Act, its property protections may be illusory for
the majority of women. See Mothoko Mamashela, New Families, New Property, New
Laws: The PracticalEffects of the Recognition of Customary MarriagesAct, 20 S. AFR. J.
ON HUM. RTS. 616, 641 (2004).
181 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 s. 3(a)(i)-(ii).
82
180

1 Id. at s. 3(l) (b).

Id. s. 3(3)(a)-(b).
184 Id.s.4.
183

185 Id. s. 4(5)(a).
186 Id. s.4(9).

187 This consideration also appears to underlie the issue of determining the age of a
minor. The Act provides that: "If the age of a person who allegedly is a minor is uncertain
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Although the Act seems to envisage a man with one or more wives, some
provisions of the Act suggest that women may in fact embark on more than one
union with a man. For example, the Act states that a man and woman who are in a
customary marriage may marry each other in a civil ceremony under the "Marriage
Act"' s "if neither of them is a spouse in a subsisting customary marriage with any
other person."' 89 With the recognition of gay civil unions, questions may also arise
about the validity of gay polygamous unions.
The Act provides that a customary marriage can only be dissolved by a court
decree on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, protecting wives in these
marriages against desertion. 190 Bringing customary marriages into the mainstream
of family law, the Act provides that the dissolution of customary marriages is
governed by the Mediation in Divorce Act1 91 and the Divorce Act.' 92
Despite the commitment to gender equality in most of the provisions of the
Act and its putative protection for wives in these unions, for feminist advocates the
most contentious aspect is the recognition of polygamous unions. The issue of the
legal recognition of polygamy has always been a difficult one for women
advocates to address. It is hard to argue that the institution of polygamy does not
discriminate against women. As I have mentioned earlier in this paper,
international human rights law has persistently recognized the equal treatment of
men and women in marriage,1 93 and it is hard to argue that polygamous unions
actually reflect such equal treatment. In addition, the symbolism of polygamy, with
its apparent benefit to males, and the arguable reification of patriarchal norms,
does not comport with societies that have made a formal commitment to equality,
like South Africa 1 94 Interestingly, Judge Posner has weighed in on the issue of
polygamy, raising several arguments against the practice. 95 One such argument is
that polygamy limits the freedom of contract for women, because "[i]n most
polygamous cultures a woman cannot make an enforceable contract to be a man's
or is in dispute, and that person's age is relevant for purposes of this Act, the registering
officer may in the prescribed manner submit the matter to a magistrate's court... which
must determine the person's age ....Id. s. 5(2).
188 Id. at s. 10 (1) (citing Act 25 of 1961, as the "Marriage Act").
189 Id. (emphasis added).
190Id. s. 8(1).
'9'Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987.
192 Divorce Act 70 of 1979.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
194For a comprehensive debate on the issues, see generally FEMINISM AND ISLAM:
LEGAL AND LITERARY PERSPECTIVES (Mai Yamani ed., 1996) (introducing Islamic
feminism by examining the history of Islamic laws, identifying obstacles to gender
equality, and highlighting the organized feminist movements in the Muslim world); Eva
Brems, Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident Voices in
Human Rights Discourse, 19 HuM. RTS. Q. 136 (1997) (arguing that feminism and cultural

relativism share common grounds and could work together).
195 RICHARD Al POSNER, SEX AND REASON 253-60 (1992).

JOURNAL OF LAW & FAMILY STUDIES

378

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[VOL. I I
[No. 2

only wife . . ,,96 Another argument is that it "undermines companionate
marriage" in several ways, including more repression of women, increasing "the
agency costs of marriage," and encouraging greater promiscuity in the wider
culture. 97
Polygamy, when considered in light of other indigenous family law
institutions, such as lobolo,198 the levirate' 99 and the sororate, 200 raises troubling
questions about the patriarchal underbelly of indigenous law. These institutions,
individually and in combination, suggest that men are still considered the
breadwinners and dominant partners in marital relationships. They therefore belie
the formal commitment to gender equality as outlined in the Act.
In South Africa, this situation rests uncomfortably with the overall context of
constitutional democracy and gender equality. Indeed, a recent Constitutional
Court challenge to a section of the Act that allowed the property consequences of
indigenous marriages entered into prior to the promulgation of the Act, to stand,
was thrown out as violating the equality provisions of the Constitution. 20 ' The
impugned provisions meant that wives in customary marriages were subjected to
the marital power of the husband, and could not hold or manage property. Writing
for the majority, Deputy Chief-Justice Moseneke observed that such a property
system "strikes at the very heart of the protection of equality and dignity '20 2 of the
Constitution, and that it should therefore be rejected,
since "the government has
20 3
advanced no justification for the discrimination.,
Whether polygamous unions will decline or not based on these assessments is
yet to be seen. The reality is, however, that polygamy is practiced fairly widely,
and that legal protection for women in polygamous unions is vital.

196

Id. at 253.

197

Id. at 255-60 (noticing that "wives in a polygamous system have more incentive to

engage in extramarital sex than wives in a monogamous system. A related point is that the

legion of young bachelors that a polygamous system creates increases the demand for
extramarital sex on the part of men as well as of women .....
198 See supra note 4.
199 See BENNETT, supra note

4, at 126-28 (explaining that under the levirate, when a

woman's husband dies, she is obliged to marry one of her deceased husband's brothers or
other male relatives).
200 See id. (explaining that under the sororate, when a man's wife dies while she is
still of child bearing age, he was given one of his deceased wife's unmarried sisters or

other female relative in marriage).

201 See Gumede (born Shange) v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others

2009 202
(3) BCLR 243 (CC)
Id. 36.
203

Id. 49.

49(S. Afr.).
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VII. CONCLUSION

By recognizing the reality of polygamous unions, the South African
legislature gives effect to its constitutional promise of allowing everyone to
practice the culture or religion of their choice. For a pluralist constitutional
democracy, such latitude is crucial. But such recognition also suggests that the
South African government is not prepared to make the hard choices that are
necessary to ensure that the pursuit of gender equality is not derailed. Even though
the Act is a celebration of cultural diversity, it also reflects a continued reticence
about gender equality. As I've tried to argue in this paper, while polygamy may
still be fairly widely practiced in South Africa, indeed, the President is a
polygamist, it is hard to make the argument that polygamy comports with gender
equality.
The recognition and celebration of South Africa's many cultural and religious
communities should not detract from the reality that the Constitution has centered
equality and dignity as primary values. The substance and symbolism of polygamy
is hard to square with gender equality and dignity for women. The Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act as a practical matter has the possibility of providing
considerable protections for women in polygamous marriages. The Act represents
a justifiable practical decision on the part of the legislature. But the protections
found in the Act are merely a palliative for the underlying realities that pressure
women into relationships that provide them with very limited choices, and that
arguably erode the benefits of dignity and full citizenship that they are entitled to.
At some point in the future, South Africa's image as a progressive democracy with
an admirable Constitution will be questioned in light of the continued toleration of
a patriarchal institution like polygamy.
I started this article with reference to Jacob Zuma's fourth marriage in order
to highlight the acceptance of the practice of polygamy, as well as the coexistence
of this practice in a society that also allows same-sex unions. In the last month I've
traveled to South Africa and had occasion to informally speak with a few
indigenous chiefs. What I've discovered is a very healthy dialectic about the place
of indigenous laws, customs and institutions within the broader constitutional
framework. This dialectic involves local communities, their leaders in the
Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa, the national parliament, and the
courts, specifically the Constitutional Court, and it is one that may ensure that the
character and substance 20of4 indigenous laws will evolve in ways that honors the
spirit of the Constitution.

204

These issues are discussed in a thoughtful manner in Nelson Tebbe, Inheritance

and Disinheritance:African Customary Law and Constitutional Rights, 88 J. RELIGION
466, 472-93 (2008) (presenting in depth discussion about the effort made in South Africa
to harmonize the Constitutional commitments to both individual rights and African
culture).

